This study compares the media discourses about Euroscepticism in 2014 across six countries (United Kingdom, Ireland, France, Spain, Sweden, and Denmark). We assess the extent to which the mass media's reporting of Euroscepticism indicates the Bivariate logistic regressions further reveal three macro-level structural variables that significantly correlate with a Europeanized media discourse: newspaper type (tabloid or broadsheet), presence of a strong Eurosceptic party, and relationship to the EU budget (net contributor or receiver of EU funds).
Introduction
The 2014 European Parliament (EP) elections resulted in over one quarter of the available seats going to Eurosceptic party members -the highest number to date (Treib, 2014) . As a result, national media outlets in several Member States reported about the 'earthquake', 'virus', or 'rising tide' of Euroscepticism sweeping across the continent.
Since research has long shown that the media's coverage of the EU influences public opinion (De Vreese, 2007) , scholars are rightly turning their attention to studying Euroscepticism in the news (Caiani and Guerra, 2017) . However, prior research has not yet examined how Euroscepticism is reported by the media as a news topic. We address this missing component by focusing our analysis on the national media discourse about Euroscepticism, which comprises explicit mentions of Euroscepticism as a phenomenon and mentions of political actors who the media labels as 'Eurosceptic'.
In particular, the study seeks to test whether the national media discourses about Euroscepticism are Europeanized and further, to uncover which structural factors drive Europeanization processes in the media. Given that Euroscepticism is a topic of relevance for the entire EU polity, the media discourse about Euroscepticism may be Europeanized. A discourse is Europeanized when an issue involving non-national or EU level actors is discussed in a similar fashion within different Member States, thus allowing for "cross-border understanding and communication" (Risse, 2014, p. 11) across national publics. Europeanized discourses increase the saliency of the EU within national public spheres and enable transnational communication between them.
Although Euroscepticism implies opposition to the EU and European integration, a
Europeanized media discourse about Euroscepticism may facilitate mutual understanding and foster cross-border dialogue among Europeans. In order to test this argument, we ask the following research questions:
1) To what extent are national media discourses about Euroscepticism
Europeanized?
2) What factors explain the presence of a Europeanized media discourse about Euroscepticism?
To answer these questions, the study employs a two-phase, mixed-methods research design. In the first phase, we select mainstream media articles published in 2014 that contain the words 'Eurosceptic' or 'Euroscepticism' across six countries:
the United Kingdom, Ireland, Spain, France, Denmark, and Sweden. Using a combination of LDA topic modeling and qualitative coding, we identify the content of the articles (i.e. what topics are discussed) as well as their scope (i.e. whether the topics concern national or European issues). In the second phase, we use logistic regressions to test which structural factors motivate a Europeanized media discourse about Euroscepticism.
The findings from the first phase demonstrate that the topics associated with
Euroscepticism are remarkably similar across five of the six cases studied, with the UK being the exception. Moreover, both the topic models and human coding reveal that 70
per cent of the 1,545 articles included in our dataset are European in scope. Therefore, we argue that the mainstream media discourse about Euroscepticism is, in fact, Europeanized. Although the UK is an exception, we also find that Britain served as a driver for Europeanization in the media discourse of other Member States; each of these cases cover British politics in the context of Euroscepticism.
Answering our second research question, the results of the log regressions expound three variables significantly correlated to the media's portrayal of Euroscepticism in a European context: newspaper type (tabloid or broadsheet), domestic Eurosceptic party success (loser or winner of the European Parliament elections), and relationship to the EU budget (net contributor or receiver of EU funds). Respectively, these variables correspond to structural features in the domestic media system, political system, and economic system, and we find that the media variable is the strongest predictor for Europeanization. Taken together, the findings suggest that Euroscepticism is a news topic present across national contexts and as such, can be one of the factors contributing to the emergence of a European public sphere. However, national context matters: the extent of Europeanization is moderated by structural factors in the media, party, and financial systems of EU Member States.
Euroscepticism in the media: A new perspective
Recent literature highlights the enduring difficulties in defining and delimiting Euroscepticism (Leruth et al., 2017) . This draws into question the analytical utility of Euroscepticism as a theoretical framework. The distinction between 'hard' and 'soft'
Euroscepticism (Taggart, 1998) only partially addresses this criticism. Szczerbiak and Taggart (2017, p. 16 ) acknowledge the 'extremely broad' scope of soft Euroscepticism, which may lead to wrongly-categorizing parties that are pro-integration. Furthermore, studies that attempt to operationalize Euroscepticism via typologies typically result in large 'diffuse' categories (de Wilde et al, 2014; Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2017, p. 14) .
The difficulties in measuring Euroscepticism derive from the complexity of the EU polity and the multifaceted character of European integration. Given that these complexities are unlikely to abate, we consider scholarly efforts to categorize the varieties of Euroscepticism a noble task -but ultimately an unfruitful one. Instead of taking Euroscepticism as a dependent or independent variable, we use it here as a test case to measure the Europeanization of public spheres. Therefore, we are not interested in studying Euroscepticism as such; rather, we want to explain why the media discourse about Euroscepticism varies across national contexts.
The present study builds on previous research arguing for the influence of macro-level structural conditions in explaining attitudes towards the EU (Koehler et al., 2018; De Vries, 2018) . Since 'attitudes towards the EU are framed by the national circumstances in which people live and their evaluations of these conditions' (De Vries, 2018, p. 3) , public opinion towards the EU is intimately linked to the configuration of domestic media, political, and economic systems. For example, Hobolt and De Vries (2016) argue that national identity, political partisanship, and economic interest are the primary influences on public opinion when it comes to the evaluation of the European integration process (Hobolt and De Vries, 2016) .
Citizens' perceptions of these three factors are heavily influenced by national press. Media coverage about the EU has been shown to affect public opinion towards the EU's policies (Maier and Rittberger, 2008) and overall performance (De Vreese, 2007) .
The mass media, to paraphrase Trenz (2013, p. 35 
Research Design
The present study's research design achieves precisely such a comparison across media systems. We select media discourses about Euroscepticism in six countries that vary along several dimensions: size, region, media system, success of a national Eurosceptic party, and relationship to the EU budget. More specifically, we focus on three criteria that relate to structural features of domestic media, political, and economic systems. The selection is designed to stratify both similarity and difference across our cases. Regarding media systems, we select two countries from each of Hallin and For each national case, we include two types of print media: quality newspapers and tabloids. We then compare the main topics presented in media articles containing the word 'Euroscepticism' and/or 'Eurosceptic' across 2014. During a European Parliament election year, the chance that Europe-related issues will appear in the media increases (Grill and Boomgaarden, 2017) . Thus, by choosing the year 2014, we purposely oversample for the presence of Europeanized topics. Should the Eurosceptic discourse not be Europeanized under these circumstances, the Europeanization phenomenon would be less likely to occur outside of election years.
Our aim is to assess whether the topics reported in these articles are comparable in terms of their content (a necessary aspect for Europeanization to occur) and their context (whether the topics are presented in a national or European scope). If topics and contexts converge across national media, we can speak of a Europeanized discourse. We then seek to uncover the structural mechanisms underpinning those instances where evidence for Europeanization is found. Grounded in prior research, we test three variables (relating to the media, political, and economic system) that we hypothesize to influence the scope of coverage about Euroscepticism.
The first variable is newspaper type, and we distinguish between broadsheet and tabloid formats. Pfetsch et al. (2008, p. 31) argue that broadsheets are 'more inclined to stress European dimensions' than tabloid press. Even in terms of the amount of coverage, quality newspapers tend to have more space reserved to European issues than tabloids (De Vreese et al., 2006) .
The second variable is the success of Eurosceptic political actors in each domestic case. National identity and party cues are two of the primary determinants of public attitudes towards the EU (Hobolt and De Vries, 2016, pp. 421-22) ; Eurosceptic parties therefore act as double influencers, since they mobilize national attachment and send party cues. According to Boomgaarden and de Vreese (2013) , political elites with an anti-EU leaning increase the visibility of the EU in national news during EP campaigns. In addition, the coverage of EP elections in each Member State tends to give priority to nationally relevant topics and politicians (Schuck et al., 2012) .
Our third variable, the role of economic factors, has been investigated by Lubbers and Scheepers (2010, p. 787) , who find that '[g]rowing media attention increases political Euroscepticism in countries with a negative EU budget balance,
whereas it decreases such skepticism in countries with a positive balance'. Also examining representations of the economic dimension in the media, De Wilde (2012) argues that the politicization of the EU budget is connected to the framing of debates as horizontal conflicts among different EU Member States -not as vertical conflicts between EU Member States and the European Commission. Similarly, Koehler et al. (2018) demonstrate that macroeconomic indicators such as low GDP growth, when coupled with media representations of the EU as a solution for economic crises, predict support for European integration.
Based on this previous research, we formulate the following hypotheses:
H1. The tabloids' Eurosceptic discourse will be more national in scope than the broadsheets'. H2. The more successful the Eurosceptic party, the more national the scope of the discourse about Eurosceptics will be. H3. Newspapers from net budget contributor countries will have a more national discourse about the Eurosceptics than net receivers.
Method and data
We identified the media discourse about Euroscepticism by searching for the keywords 'Eurosceptic' and 'Euroscepticism' (in the respective languages [1] ) across three media article databases: LexisNexis, Retriever, and Infomedia. We chose these criteria after including other words and phrases indicative of Euroscepticism (e.g., 'anti-EU', 'critical of the EU', 'opposed to European integration'), but we found that the addition of these words did not significantly increase the size of our sample. Important to emphasize is that not all of the articles were centrally about Euroscepticism as a phenomenon; rather, the article merely needed to include one of the two words to be included in the study.
We embrace this broad selection criterion precisely because we want to chart the variety of contexts alongside which Euroscepticism is mentioned, to cast a wide net for topic convergence. This approach, versus including keywords for various issues related to Euroscepticism like immigration or austerity, also ensures the selection is strictly comparable across cases.
Our sample includes all articles from the top two broadsheets and top two tabloids [2] by circulation in each country during the period January 1 -December 31,
2014. This resulted in 1,545 articles, distributed as follows: Spain (467), Denmark whereas others see a strong presence of tabloids, [3] in particular Britain and Sweden We extracted the predominant topics associated with our keywords for each national media environment using unsupervised LDA topic modeling for articles from each national case. LDA topic modeling, a computational content analysis method based on patterns of word co-occurrence across documents, has been used to identify the print media coverage of policy domains such as the government support for the arts (DiMaggio et al., 2013) or nuclear technology (Jacobi et al., 2016) . One of the advantages of topic modeling is that it enables comparative analysis even when data distribution across cases is uneven, allowing us to analyze the Irish case despite the low number of articles collected. The results of the model provide a strict, statisticallyderived measure to compare the generated topics across cases.
Before fitting each national media corpus as a model, the text was subjected to pre-processing using the 'quanteda' (Benoit et al., 2017) package for the programming software R. To increase the accuracy of our models, we stemmed and removed stopwords for each national case using quanteda's default language dictionaries, and we subsequently added stopwords deemed irrelevant to our analysis. This process was conducted through repeated iterations of automated content analysis of the top 50 words for each national case, until all 50 top words were deemed relevant for study. For each respective language, we removed commonly appearing words that were deemed not useful in conveying political content as well as the first names of prominent politicians (e.g. 'Angela', 'David', 'Jean-Claude'). Since some outlets referred to politicians by their first and last names, and other outlets preferred only the last name, we dropped the first name to reduce noise. In a similar vein, we also combined the names of political parties and institutions, treating them as one word ('uni-grams'). These pre-processing steps were taken in order to increase the coherence and accuracy of generated topics.
The LDA modeling was performed using the 'lda' package for the programming software R (Chang, 2015) . While no standardized rules exist for selecting the number of topics, based on the size of the data and several iterative tests to maximize coherency, we chose 10 clusters for Ireland, 15 for the UK, and 20 each for Denmark, Sweden, Spain, and France. [4] We set the model's parameters to 1500 iterations with an alpha of .1. We then qualitatively assigned labels to each of the topics according to their content (see Appendix B). If a topic could not be inferred, we discarded it from the analysis.
Then, we manually categorized each topic as either 'National' or 'European', depending on the whether the topic signaled content relevant to domestic or nonnational politics.
To conduct the bivariate logistic regressions, we first used human coding to 
Results
Having read and coded all of the media articles included in the study, we found that the LDA topic models performed well despite differences in language and corpus size.
In the countries where 20 topics were requested (Spain, Denmark, Sweden, and France), the LDA model generated 18, 17, 17, and 16 coherent topics, respectively.
The British topic model produced 13 interpretable topics out of 15, and the Irish case 7 out of 10. After manually labeling the coherent topics by scope -i.e. whether they concerned national or European politics -we report the results below in Table 1 European topics, with color-coded edges marking the connection between national media and the generated topics. The size of the nodes corresponds to the total amount of times a topic appears in our model. Fracasso et al. (2015) applied a similar method in their study of the transnational coverage of the euro crisis. However, our method differs in that the nodes are topics and not, like in their case, country mentions.
Topics in the center of the graph were present in three or more of the countries' 'Euroscepticism' appears in national media reportage, 'similar frames are used in the various public arenas so as to allow cross-border understanding and communication' (Risse, 2014, p. 11 
Structural factors in the Europeanization of Euroscepticism discourse
To answer our second research question -what factors explain the presence of a Europeanized media discourse about Euroscepticism? -we tested which of our three independent variables is most closely associated with the presence of a European scope in our data. We did not differentiate by country since we consider our selection process to represent enough variation across cases. Moreover, we do not consider the small number of articles collected for the Irish case to affect the overall quality of our results, with the potential exception of the last bivariate regression on the EU budget relationship (where more cases are needed to increase confidence in the generalizability of the results).
To answer this second research question, we first performed a chi-square test of the strength of association between European topics and our three structural variables: newspaper type, position of national Eurosceptic party, and relationship to EU budget. In all three cases the p-value was significant at p<.05, allowing us to proceed with performing bivariate log regressions. We calculated the odds ratio, a method typically used for categorical variables such as ours, in order to assess the likelihood that articles with a European scope would appear in broadsheets as opposed to tabloids (Table 2) . As expected, the odds ratio registers in favor of broadsheets hosting articles with a European scope by a multiple higher than three, thus confirming H1. Table 3 shows that content presented in a European context was over one and a half times more likely to occur in newspapers from countries where Eurosceptics were electorally weak, compared to where they performed strongly. Table 4 shows that newspapers from net receiving countries (IE, ES) were over two and a half times more likely to publish content with a European scope than net contributors (UK, FR, DK, SE). This finding supports our final hypothesis, H3.
While all three of the variables tested had a significant effect on whether media discourse relating to Euroscepticism was framed in a national or European context, the strength of association differed across variables. According to our analysis, the strongest predictor for European coverage is newspaper type, with broadsheets being over three times more likely to cover Eurosceptic actors or events in a European (i.e., nonnational) context. The second strongest predictor of a European context was the Member State's relation to the EU budget (with an odds ratio of 2.85 in favor of states that receive more than they contribute), and the weakest was the degree of domestic Eurosceptic party success (the European context was 1.57 times more likely to be present when there was no strong Eurosceptic party on the national scene). further allows us to claim that Europeans have access to similar frames of reference regarding Euroscepticism. Driven by the media, such possibilities for common understanding satisfy one of the primary conditions for the existence of a European public sphere as outlined by Risse (2014) .
The horizontal Europeanization identified, however, was not uniform. Our study corroborates the idea that some countries elicit more references in western European media than others. With the exception of Poland and Hungary, East European Member
States were entirely absent from our dataset. By contrast, the UK is the predominant reference node for the reportage on Euroscepticism, although the pan-European narrative of the 'rise of the Eurosceptics' is also an important common trope. The media's preoccupation with the UK supports existing research that some countries have more net gravity in attracting foreign news attention than others. Both Koopmans and Statham (2010, p. 67) and Fracasso et al. (2015, p.7) find that France, Germany, and the UK account for half of the claims in foreign media coverage about the EU. While the other five countries in our study report about British politics (e.g., the Scottish referendum or the referendum on the EU membership of the UK), the British reader was hard pressed to find any media references to events taking place in continental Europe.
This discrepancy in coverage may indicate, but may have also contributed to, the perception of isolation and idiosyncrasy that is often associated with the UK in its relationship to Europe. Our findings help contextualize the British media's coverage of the EU before Brexit, where the print media is argued to have heavily shaped the national debate (Seaton, 2016) .
In addition, our analysis finds that media type is the strongest predictor for
Eurosceptic coverage to take a European scope in national press. Confirming the results of Pfetsch (2008, p. 31) and Hepp et al. (2016, p. 106) , our data show tabloids were more national than European in their coverage of news, a finding that may be explained by the media's proclivity to appeal to a domestic readership. In comparison with broadsheet readers, tabloid readers tend to have lower social status (Chan and Goldthorpe, 2007) and be less educated -two socio-economic indicators that are often attributed to supporters of Eurosceptic parties (Lubbers and Scheepers, 2010, p. 812) .
The effect of these individuals' exposure to mostly national coverage of pan-European phenomena, such as the rise of Euroscepticism, may further reduce their sense of shared belonging to a European public.
Broadsheets were much more likely to place Euroscepticism in a European context, perhaps due to their more informed, affluent readership that also has a higher tendency to support European integration (Serrichio et al., 2012 Regarding our third variable that examined the country's relationship to the EU budget, previous research has argued that media coverage in countries with a positive EU budget balance decreases Euroscepticism (Lubbers and Scheepers, 2010, p. 787 
Conclusion
This study sought to answer whether the national media discourse relating to Euroscepticism is Europeanized. We conclude that it is, and that this Europeanization process is driven by national media outlets. Through expounding the most salient issues discussed in news articles containing the words 'Eurosceptic' and 'Euroscepticism' during 2014, we find a strong convergence in topics in five of the six cases studied.
While the discourse about Euroscepticism in the UK appears the least Europeanized, we find that British Euroscepticism nevertheless drives other Member States' media to discuss Euroscepticism under the shared frame of British politics. We did not test direct cross-border communication initiatives between Member State media or citizens; however, we consider the similar topics discussed by the media in the context of reporting about Euroscepticism sufficient to fulfill the precondition of 'mutual understanding' (Risse, 2014, p. 11) needed for a European public sphere to emerge. 
